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Abstract—Bitcoin and Ethereum are novel mechanisms for
decentralizing the concept of money and computation. Extending
decentralization to the human identity concept, we can think of
using blockchain for creating a list of verified human identities
with a one-person-one-ID property. UniqueID is a Decentralized
Autonomous Organization(DAO) for maintaining human identi-
ties such that every physical human entity can have no more that
one account. One part of this identity is simply the user’s claim
on one of his unique, permanent, and measurable characteristics
-biometrics. Blockchain has proved its integrity as a platform
for storing and performing computations on such claims. The
biggest challenge here is to ensure that the user has submitted
his own valid biometric data. Human verifiers can check if there
is any inconsistency in other users’ data, by peer-to-peer checks.
For preventing bad behavior and centralization in the verification
process, UniqueID benefits from novel governance mechanisms to
choose verifiers and punish unjust ones. Also, there are incentives
for honest verifiers and users by newly generated tokens. We
show how the users’ privacy can be preserved by using state-
of-the-art cryptographic techniques, and so they can use their
identity without any concerns for votings, financial and banking
purposes, social media accounts, reputation systems etc.
I. INTRODUCTION
Identity verification has always been an important prob-
lem in online systems. While identity is a key to solve a
wide range of challenges, including Sybil attacks [16] and
accountable votings, there is no universal system for holding
human identities. Identity databases are usually created and
managed by governments or financial institutions privately.
Social media and messengers solved the problem partially
by relying on other systems such as E-mail, mobile phone
number, credit card information, and other reputable social
media accounts. These methods are not suitable for highly
critical applications(e.g. voting) and prone to violating users
privacy. Currently, there is not any system for assigning every
online human exactly one account, which can be used for
logging into other systems as well.
Centralized models for identity verification are all prone to
misuses, fake identities, and political conflicts. Identity is a
political concept, and nation-states will come against every
system that aims to collect their citizen identities. Moreover,
we need to make sure that such an authority does not create
fake identities, or excluding a specific group of people from
the system in favor of itself.
Blockchain brings us a decentralized way for recording
specific data in an immutable ledger -which the correctness
of data is also guaranteed by computer code, based on pre-
specified rules. Decentralized money is a direct application of
such a ledger. A monetary system can be reduced to statements
in forms of “X has c coins” and “X gives Y c coins”.
Bitcoin [1] just records these statements -transactions- in its
Blockchain. Nature of identity verification is very close to
this record logic because identity is simply some information
about you, and some claims about the correctness of those
information by other people.
UniqueID aims to bring online and decentralized one-
person-one-account system based on biometric data for rec-
ognizing people, human verifiers for identity verification pro-
cesses, and blockchain for recording data. Similar to Bitcoin
which incentivizes people who contribute their computational
power to network with new Bitcoins, UniqueID uses a token
system and a novel governance mechanism to incentivize
human verifiers and distributing operations while preventing
the creation of a monopoly of power and bad behavior.
Recently there have been efforts in order to create decen-
tralized identity verification systems with different approaches.
[3–5] are examples of such systems. To the best of our
knowledge, among all the systems which provide a unique
account for every person, none of them are permissionless,
fully decentralized, and permanent at the same time.
Identity is also an important problem, not just in the digital
world. Roots of many nation-wide issues are identity-related
issues. Over 1 billion people do not have any identity docu-
ment, and can not participate in financial and legal transactions
[6]. Old institutions for democracy are changing too slowly
and are not efficient, because of bureaucratic and paper-based
identities leads to costly votings [7]. Universal basic income,
as a novel idea, can be executed only in the existence of a
worldwide identity system [8].
II. PROBLEM SPECIFICATION
In this section, we define our problem formally.
A. Problem Statement
The simplest formulation of our problems is:
Create a decentralized system for assigning exactly one public
key to every human, without violating users’ privacy.
This definition may create some debates. First, we must
define words like user, human, and decentralized as we see
in next section. We can see this system as maintaining and
managing a list of valid public keys without trusting any
centralized authority. By system, we mean a socio-economic
entity where some group of people, encouraged by economic
incentives, form a specific structure toward achieving a goal.
B. Terminology
1) Human: When we want to design an identity system for
humans, we must tackle two questions:
1. What makes an entity a human?
2. What makes this human persistent over time? How can we
say one person is the same over time?
The first question is crucial, to determine who can enter the
system. Can we name a strong Artificial Intelligence a human?
It seems that all of us have some consensus on a definition of
a human. It’s a combination of some specific body properties
(e.g. shape, face, etc.) and intellectual abilities (e.g. memory,
language, etc.).
The second question is harder, and a famous unsolved problem
in philosophy [9]. If we want to map the identity of a person
to any of his properties, we lose something. for example, if
we define personal identity over time as a person’s body, it is
known that all body cells are replaced after some time. But
we just need some properties that are persistent over time for
most people (without any fundamental philosophical reason).
We can name three of these properties:
• Biometrics: Some specific human body structures have
proven to be persistent and unique over time. Finger-
prints, DNA and iris scan are examples of proper bio-
metrics.
• Memory: The average human brain can memorize some
data and recognize it over time. Persistence of memory
is almost true for all people.
• Trust: This is less clear than the previous properties.
Trust is how other people know and recognize one
person. Basically, it is a combination of some mind-body
properties. However here, judging over these properties
is up to others. Trust is how other people see someone
as persistent and unique over time. Human judgment can
make some errors, but it works well in many situations.
2) Decentralized: Defining decentralization, especially in a
rigorous form is very hard mostly because it takes different
forms in different contexts [10]. We focus on decentralization
in its political form here: there is no specific entity -state,
corporation- or person who can affect the system, creating or
removing identities. One side of this decentralization is the
inability of an entity in changing ledger information: account
balances, biometrics etc. Blockchain already makes this part
possible. Another side is the inability in adding identities and
influencing how people trust each other, and here is where our
design should gain such decentralization.
We always see the first side as “How much money or co-
ordination is needed for attacking the system”, e.g. Bitcoin
hashrate gives us a minimum on computational power (that can
be expressed in computational devices that one can buy with
money) that an attacker needs for the double-spending attack.
Besides, how current hashrate distributed shows us another
aspect of decentralization: minimum number of entities that
form at least 51 percent of the system. However, we have
harder times dealing with the second side. One can formalize
that as “How many people should collude, and how much
money they need, in order to do X in the system?” X can
be making one fake identity, making infinite fake identities,
preventing someone from entering the system (censorship) and
any other unwanted incident. We analyze our system from this
point of view in section 6.
3) Incentives: We can see this kind of system as a form of
the cooperative game, where people interact with each other
for reaching a shared goal. For this reason, there must be
enough incentives for parties to participate. Formally speaking,
we should determine the amount of effort, energy and other
resources every party has to put, and how many tokens he gets
back. Analysing this market can give us the equilibrium and
the prediction of what will happen at the end. In the case of
Bitcoin, e.g., there are always incentives for some group of
people (miners) for running full nodes and miner equipment
for earning new Bitcoins, so the system will be alive as long
as these coins are paid to them.
4) Privacy: Privacy is the ability of an individual or group
to have control over all the information about themselves
and to whom they express. Privacy and data protection are
of the most important challenges in every blockchain-based
system because it is known that decentralized systems are
inherently transparent, and all data can be accessed by any
node. As shown in recent researches, many cryptocurrencies
are at the risk of linking transactions and other data leaks. This
transparency and lack of privacy is a cost of high security
and immutability of them. We need more consideration for
preserving privacy in a permanent identity system which can
be used for critical purposes. Cryptographic advancements,
such as functional cryptography, program obfuscation, and
ring signatures can be used for enhancing privacy in UniqueID.
We will discuss privacy concerns and imaginable solutions in
depth in next chapter.
III. UNIQUEID DESIGN
In this section, we come up with a detailed explanation of
how UniqueID works and solves the decentralized proof-of-
unique-human problem. First, we provide an overall flow of
the system, and then we cover the concepts and components
which our system consists of.
A. Overal Flow
Here we focus on the flow of processing one user’s identity
for understanding how UniqueID works. Users should submit
their biometric data to the blockchain and then prove the
validity of the claimed biometric. This proofs are social
and based on trust; It means you must get some biometric
reproducing certificate from some of the previously accepted
users, i.e. verifiers. These verifiers ask you to reproduce your
claimed biometric in presence of themselves. After collecting
enough trust, the user is recognized as a valid and unique
one. At a technical level, Blockchain brings us the storage
and computation we need for these tasks.
There are some questions arising here, such as how users
get assigned to verifiers, what are the incentives of verifiers
for checking others’ claims and where is the starting point of
the system. We discuss these questions and provide solutions
for them in following subsections.
B. Biometrics
Biometric data is how UniqueID identifies and recognize
“humans”. We need almost permanent, unique and well-
studied biometrics for our system that has an acceptable
accuracy level, and also storing them on blockchain do not
create any privacy concerns. Biometric data will be used to
check the uniqueness of individuals and prevent the creation of
fake identities and Sybil attacks. A wide range of physical and
behavioral biometric indicators have been developed during
last decades in the literature of biometrics-based identification,
including iris, face, finger vein, hand geometry, typing, etc
[11]. Advancements in machine learning and image processing
offer many well-studied and tested methods of biometrics-
based identification with equal error rate (EER) of at most
0.01, let alone methods with much higher accuracy. Roughly
speaking, compounding at least 4 of uncorrelated different
biometrics as a biometric indicator, our system is ready to
serve and identify 100 million people.
C. Trustless Setup
In a system where current users should approve new ones,
one should come up with a mechanism for approving very first
users. One method is beginning with a sufficient number of
trusted persons and introduce their identities (biometrics and
keys) as verified users. The challenge is how to select these
persons without any need for a central third party? Below we
explain three solutions for this issue.
Transparent Peer-to-Peer Setup: Transparency can be the
key to solving the trustless setup problem. Usually, there
is a community of enthusiastic people around these kinds
of projects. By providing relevant information in a public
channel, the community invited for joining a public party in
special place and time. Everyone who aims to join has to send
her proposal including name, biometrics and some identity
document -just for transparency purposes. In the party, they
start to verify each other in a peer-to-peer manner. Because
the party is public, everyone can join and there would no
monopoly or closed group of individuals at the beginning.
Also, it’s near impossible to fake an identity because it can be
detected and claimed by just one person in the party. There
can be a live cast of all of the steps of the party and all of
the relevant information in a public channel for forwarding
transparency.
Trusted Famous People: There are some people with a
public profile who have no incentive for sabotaging the sys-
tem, e.g. university professors, known artists, and athletes or
popular cafes. This is usually because of their high reputation
among other individuals. Collecting some of these people
who want to join in early verifying, and broadcasting all the
information and profiles can be a starting point for the system.
Decentralized CAPTCHA Party: CAPTCHAs [12] are
mechanisms for recognizing humans from machines.
CAPTCHAs are AI-hard and it takes reasonable time for
humans to solve them. Consider we construct some hard
CAPTCHA that takes about 2 minutes for an average person
to solve. We then organize a CAPTCHA party: in a specific
time around the world, based on some common randomness
(e.g. blockhash) a predefined smart contract starts assigning
CAPTCHAs to participants. People can prove their uniqueness
by submitting an answer to the assigned CAPTCHA before
the party ends.
D. Verification Mechanism
We assume that there is a number of verifiers, say 100, in
the city. Location and city of every verifier recorded in the
blockchain. Call the user’s public key pk.
after one user enters the system with his biometric, he
should verify his identity and get certificates from a sufficient
number of these verifiers(3 can be enough here). Assigning
verifiers to users would be done via blockchain regarding
user’s location and some common randomness. The ran-
domness can be produced by another smart contract, with
methods like [19]. This randomness,Ri combined and hashed
with user’s public key (SHA256(Ri||pk) can determine the
assignment.
The user then goes to all of the assigned verifiers in
person and reproduce his biometric in the presence of verifier.
Reproducing means sampling user’s biometric with verifier’s
biometric device, and then ensuring equality of this sample
with previous biometrics on blockchain with some local com-
putation on verifier’s device. If the verifier ensures that two
biometrics are the same, he accepts the user and issues a
certificate with his signature on the blockchain. This process is
for preventing fake biometrics attacks and identity thefts from
happening because verifiers can make sure that the biometric
is real and belongs to the person who claims it.
After user gaining these certificates, the system automati-
cally accepts him as a valid and unique person. If only one of
the verifiers does not issue the certificate, the user can ask for
a reassignment. This is possible when one of the verifiers is
corrupted or has made some error. There is no incentive for
a verifier in rejecting a real user, as the user can ask for a
reassignment afterward.
For preventing Sybil attacks, and ensuring that an adversary
with many attempts can not break verification process and
assigned to his favorable verifiers we add a barrier in entering
the system. There are just three ways you can ask for the initial
assignment:
• Via invitation. Every verified user has two invitations
that can give them to other public keys so they can submit
their biometrics and start the verification process. because
there is a limited number of verified users, there will be
always a limited number of verifications (and therefore
performing an effective attack would need large human
resources).
• Via Stake. The user can put some specified amount of
money at stake for starting the verification process. At the
end if he verified by the system, the system automatically
will return his stake, otherwise, his stake will be locked
forever. The amount of stake should be in a direct relation
with all unverified stakes in the corresponding city, means
the more unverified users, the more stake a user should
put.
• Via V erifiers. Every verifier has an authority of starting
the verification process for a specified number -according
to his reputation and trust- of new users.
Also, the process of assigning the verifiers should be done
respectively, means the user just know who is the next verifier.
If the user completed and verified with the current verifier,
then the next one will be assigned by the system. This should
restrict the power of an adversary in rejection of an unwanted
assignment.
E. Trust Delegation
Trust is the fundamental key to bring healthy behavior
in our system. Every unique person has one “trust” token
which can delegate it to everyone. With this non-tradable
token, one can delegate his verifying authority to someone
else, because he can not actively verify new users. Thus the
verifier which possess a greater number of trust tokens have
more verifying power, and more the system can trust their
acceptance/rejection.
The system will then give verification power to those which
possess at least x trust tokens, in order to make verification
process more reliable. this parameter must set based on the city
population and maturity of the system. Verifiers can collect
trust from users by Transparency. For example, a verifier can
provide access to a live cast of the verification processes
on a youtube channel, or permits everyone coming to his
office (doors are open!). By providing more transparency, more
people can trust him.
Also, every user must have incentives for delegating her trust
to a trustworthy person. Restricting some important features
of the system (e.g. Universal Basic Income) from those who
did not delegate their trust is one solution. Also if a corrupted
verifier identified (there will be some mechanisms for identi-
fying corrupted behaviors), all his trust will be suspended for
some period of time.
F. Native Token
We introduced a native token for our platform, However,
For every token system we should answer to at least 3
questions:
1) What is the necessity of creating a new token, Or why the
system needs it?
2) What is the utility of this token for users, Or why it has
non-zero value?
3) What is the monetary system, Or how tokens issued and
distributed?
1) Nessecity: First, we need a token for creating incentive
mechanisms. every decentralized platform needs sophisticated
and well-studied incentives, for encouraging healthy behavior
and punishing bad actors. One of the powerful tools to
design mechanism is money because it is related to person’s
desirability and profits. In our system verifiers rewarded by
tokens every time they verify a new, fresh user. Also, new
users get some tokens for the first time they enter the system.
Also, some important applications, such as UBI, need some
form of currency.
2) Utility: The most obvious use of such a token is for
payments and store of value. Incentives bring new users to the
system, and new users bring more acceptability and a wider
market, projected in token price, bringing new incentives for
further users. This positive network-effect, combined with a
mechanism for more incentivizing first movers(but not make
them giant Whales!) can bring non-zero value for the token.
Also, this system can host many other applications which
need a unique and permanent identity, such as digital banking,
property and real estate on the blockchain, reputation systems
etc. These systems can provide their services on the UniquID
blockchain, using a native token or at least paying fees for
their smart contracts.
3) Monetary system: Our goal is to achieve an issuance
scheme which is fair and keeps the value of the token. Our
proposal is selling fix amount of tokens (say, a∗x) in pre-sale
(with an Initial Coin Offering or similar methods) and then
issuing x tokens for every new user. This tokens distributed
between verifiers of that user and herself. So after a new users,
tokens in the hands of users is equal to ICO tokens. This can
provide fairness for the system because initial holders are not
giants anymore, and after the system became popular(=more
users) their influence gets reduced. Also, initial investors have
incentives for investment because they can buy cheap tokens
in early stages. It will be promised to them that their tokens
have an influence equal to a users, and they can guess what
they earn by the estimated value of an identity system with a
users. This issuance scheme is linear in the number of users,
However, the utility of users(network effect) is quadratic, so
we can predict a slight rise in price over time. At least,
It’s not a super-inflationary system: More user’s, more utility,
more demand and more supply responding to them. Choosing
a parameter and schemes for incentivizing early users (e.g.
changing reward over time) is for further research.
The figure for comparing network effect and money supply.
G. Decentralized Governance
There is no independent entity for decision-making in
decentralized systems, so they face governance problems on
many levels. Long discussions on DAO fork and Bitcoin Seg-
wit2x proposal are clear examples of this issue. In UniqueID,
There is a new concept that should be governed as well, human
work. There should be some mechanism for detecting and
punishing corrupted verifiers.
UniqueID is inherently one-person-one-vote, and this gives
us new opportunities for shaping our governance model. We
introduce some hierarchical representative democratic system,
based on three layers of representatives.
First, small communities of 50 − 100 persons choose one
person from themselves. They put their trust and vote on him,
and can also track his activity and ask him about that. Because
they are a small group of people, it is expected that they know
each other well and can make necessary communications be-
tween themselves and choose a qualified representative. these
are layer-1 representatives, and they should know each other
and follow system changes and discussions, and also choose
layer-2 persons. Every 30−40 of these layer-1 representatives
should gather and choose one representative. And the same for
layer-3: every 20− 30 layer-2 people can choose one layer-3
representative from them.
This system should decide for critical decisions such as
choosing parameters and consensus rules. Majority consensus
seems a very good method for making decisions in a system
with verified identities but also can cause some problems. Not
every decision can be made by a majority (51 percent) of votes.
Changing some critical parameter of a system (number of
verifiers needed for verifying one person) is a clear example of
this. So we need to group decisions based on their importance
and put some thresholds on the percentage of votes needed
for making decisions in every group (super-majority rules).
Because of low participation, lack of incentive for voting
and lack of knowledge for making correct decisions we
should give some authority to representatives. But for lowering
corruption and collusion, in addition to transparency, every
decision needs greater consensus among higher layers. for
example, if we need 51 percent of all user votes for some
parameter change, we need 68, 85, 95 percent of votes for
layer 1,2,3, respectively.
In this process, people can track their trustee activities and
votes, and ask for explanation and reasons. Everyone can
change his trustee every time, and delegate his trust to another
one. However, representatives should not lose their position
with leaving one of their trusts, so there can be a threshold(e.g.
20 percent) that when they leave, the person becomes invalid.
H. Implementation
Formally, UniqueID is a decentralized autonomous
organization (DAO) which its operation is based on a
decentralized IT infrastructure. In this section, we focus on
the IT infrastructure part. While there are various possible
scenarios of implementation for UniqueID, ranging from
building on top of existing blockchain-based platforms to the
creation of a standalone blockchain, we describe a modest
implementation scenario using existing technologies.
UniqueID uses a set of smart contracts on Ethereum
blockchain as a compuational back-end and immutable stor-
age, all the functionalities of system and interactions of users
(e.g. claiming a new identity, verification process, delegation
of trust, etc.) are implemented in solidity and get done on-
chain. Moreover while UniqueID stores critical information
like the state of users in the verification process and the hash
of biometrics data (as a unique identifier) on the blockchain,
in order to reduce the prohibitively large cost of on-chain
storage, biometrics data will be stored on Swarm. Each identity
holder is responsible to make sure her biometric data is always
available on Swarm, it means that in case of data loss she has
to upload same biometric data to the network again otherwise
her identity get temporary invalid.
One of the core functionalities of UniqueID is to compare
different biometric data in order to verify the uniqueness of
identities and verify consistency of reproduced biometric data
by new identity claimers. While it’s possible to give this
responsibility to human verifiers, in order to minimize hu-
man mistakes while maximizing automation and transparency,
UniqueID uses Truebit [13] protocol to get this task done.
I. Improvements over verification
The verification system we purpose face some challenges.
Bribing or coordinating some verifiers for creating fake identi-
ties is the most important one. Fake-ID prevention is the only
thing we design our system for solving that.
We can see two directions for solving this attacks. First, Set
some sophisticated and hard rules for entering people that
guarantee hardness of attacks. Second, design some mecha-
nisms for detecting and removing fake identities and punishing
bad verifiers. In this section, we explain a mechanism of the
second kind.
We first design a very secure registration way that there is zero-
probability in entering with a fake identity, calling it A-judge.
This can be a very hard process, including being verified by all
verifiers in a specific city. There can be gathering of verifiers
every 6 months in a public place, and handling all A-judges
there.
Using A-judges, we can design a system for lowering
amount of coordination between verifiers for creating fake
identities. We give every verifier and every layer-3 represen-
tative limited number of Identity re-checks per month. They
can use these re-checks for calling specific identities (here,
biometrics) forgoing through A-judge. These called identities
should pass A-judge in a specified time, Otherwise, they lose
their identity. Also, they have great incentive for going through
this judge, because they rewarded by tokens. This way we can
find fake-identities and punish bad verifiers.
Every verifier stakes X tokens and locks them. If the system
determines some verifiers as a bad verifier, his stake goes for
anyone who called A-judge for his fake identity. So verifiers
have the incentive for calling A-judges over fake identities if
they know any. This makes coordination very hard: even if you
bribe heavily some verifiers, After that, they can call A-judge
over that identity. There should be also some random checks
for preventing other forms of bad behavior.
J. Privacy
We can see different aspects of data privacy concerns in
UniqueID. Below we discuss each of them and their solutions
in more detail.
Biometric Data: In UniqueID we need user’s biometric data
for the human identification process. Leaking biometrics can
lead to the harmful use of them, such as proving procedure
in courts or searching for a possessor of a special account
by authorities. What we need is a way for preserving the
functionality of the system, without exposing biometrics to
anyone.
More formally, the process of biometrics can be described
in terms of user Ui puts his biometrics Bi in a ledger L. This
ledger then compute the function AI(Ui, Uj) for every j ≤ i,
ensuring Ui is a fresh and new biometric. The output of the
AI(x, y) can be binary, or a number in [0,1] demonstrating
the similarity between x and y. We want to preserve the
functionality of AI function, But keeping Ui secret.
Finding an efficient and decentralized solution for this is
an interesting challenge. We present a solution here which
needs trusted setup. Consider there are public and private keys
pk, sk, where pk is known to the public but nobody knows sk.
Also define PrivAI(X,Y ) as a code that first decrypting X
and Y with sk, and then computes AI on them. ObfPrivAI
is obfuscated version of program PrivAI (Indistinguishable
Obfuscation).
In a trusted setup, we can compute sk, pk, PrivAI and
ObfPrivAI in one session, and then removing sk and
PrivAI . Then we put ObfPrivAI on the ledger instead of
AI . Every user sends an encrypted version of his biometric,
Encpk(Ui), to the ledger. Now we can compare biometrics
and gain predefined functionalities, without exposing user’s
biometrics. Designing some Multiparty setting for trusted
setup, Proving the correctness of trusted setup procedure
and thinking about more efficient protocols can be further
challenges.
Secure Logins: One can use UniqueID blockchain for de-
signing some decentralized application, especially as the one-
person-one-account property is attracting for some purposes,
such as social media or banking. It is plausible that these
systems should hold user’s data private, and the identity of
users should not be revealed. More formally, there should
be no relation between user’s public key (or biometrics) and
his social media account. This can be solved by introducing
anonymous tokens, means having a special token (one to-
ken per person, specified in application’s smart contract) for
logging in. Adding the ability to send tokens anonymously
between accounts, the user can send his app-token to anony-
mous account and start with a fresh identity. This ability can
be achieved by ring signatures [14] or zero-knowledge proofs
[15], working examples are Monero, Zcash or Raiden network.
There should be also a way for everyone for burning his
previous identity (by revealing the relationship between his
main and application account) and start with a fresh identity
in the application. This process is crucial for preventing the
creation of the token market.
IV. CHALLANGES
A. Geographical Dispersion
Until now we assume that there is one city, where all
verifiers and users are close to each other and interaction
between them is easy. In the real world, however, we have
thousands of cities in different countries, villages, no-residence
areas etc. This variety makes some serious challenges for
a system relying heavily on peer-to-peer verifications in the
same place.
The first problem is how new cities and places will join
the system? So far we design our system and “first verifiers”
based on assumption that they are all in the same place, That’s
not true in real world. Imagine a scenario where we start the
system from Tokyo, and after a while, people in Vienna want
to join the system. Should they go to Tokyo and Verify their
identity?
Some possible solutions we talk about them here, but
solving this problem needs more thinking. First, we can have
another trustless setup in the new city. But for keeping the
integrity of the system, other existing verifiers around the
world should take place in this setup. The system should
choose these people and provide their expenses in a secure
and decentralized way (Making a data feed for the list of
valid cities, and some kind of voting or random assigning
between volunteer verifiers). So based on these new verifiers,
users in this city can start their verification processes. Another
solution is to make as many as verifiers in the first setup,
Bringing people from different locations around the world in
one borderless place (an airport, e.g.) and then start the system
with these verifiers.
Second is how residences in small cities and villages can
join the system? Areas with population less than 10000
may don’t have any verifiers at all. One possible solution is
assigning them to nearest cities, But it makes an entry barrier
for them. Another solution is sending some verifiers from near
cities for verification, But it can bring some attack vectors and
unpredictable behavior.
Other methods: It seems that using other methods of
verification, we can solve the identity problem without facing
geographical dispersion. We think that this challenge is funda-
mental, i.e. near every system for securely verifying identities
has this problem.
First, verifying human identity always require some human
work. Until now, It’s impossible for an AI for answering
the question of “sameness” of two human objects over time.
Nature of identity, Combination of physical and mental at-
tributes, is the root of this hardness. So people should identify
people. Now, we have choices of making this verification in
same physical place, or from long distance. We argue that
long-distance methods are prone to errors and attacks: Every
long distance method consists of sending some documents and
information and making some interaction (video chat, voice
chat etc.) between verifier and user. Both have limitations:
every document (video proof of your biometric, voice captcha
etc.) can get hacked with AI methods. Even further, AI enables
us to fake a face in real-time video chat.
Geographical dispersion of people around the world makes
some fundamental challenge for identity systems. Even in a
simple(and bad!) system which you should get some certifi-
cates from your friends (and you get verified after that) we
face this problem because people you know are mostly near
you.
B. Hard Forks
C. Massive Computation and Storage
The current design of UniqueID requires permanent storage
of all claimed biometrics and also a computational infrastruc-
ture for automatic uniqueness check of new claims comparing
to previously verified ones. While It is theoretically possible
to do all the storage and computation on the blockchain, say
Ethereum [2], but practically, in that case, the cost of operation
will become prohibitively large.
In the early stages of development, UniqueID will utilize
IPFS or other production-ready decentralized storage solutions
to store biometric claims. TrueBit protocol offers a general
purpose solution to make computation off-chain at the cost of
negligible less decentralization.
While TrueBit protocol can practically mitigate the problem
of prohibitive computation costs, it is important to note that
the special task of checking uniqueness of new biometric
claims is capable of being done in parallel. One can think
of a smart-contract that offer a reward for the one who finds
the closest previously verified unique biometric to the new
claim, the results can be verified using a TrueBit like protocol.
This design prevents waste of computational resources to a
significant level.
To get most out of UniqueID network, it is reasonable to
develop an independent blockchain and storage layer. It will
enable the potential for Proof-of-unique-Human mining sys-
tem which is explained in “Novel Mining System” section.
D. Identity Theft or Death
Identity needs to be secure against theft or getting lost, on
the other hand, to enable some features like UBI, it is required
to eliminate dead identities.
As we suggested in “Problem Specification” section, there is
a close relationship between the definition of human in our
design and trust, based on that point of view we propose a
solution for identity theft problem. Each user has to declare a
group of at-least 5 trusted ones (friends, family or lawyer) as
her trust circle, which have the authority to agree on identity
theft or loss and owner of that account can reclaim his identity
with new private-key by participating in the validation process.
Based on how much the system can tolerate the dead identities,
one can think of an extending process for identity holders, sim-
ilar to new identity registration process with less redundancy.
E. Centralization of Validation Mechanism
There is always a fear about centralization of processes in
decentralized systems, like what happens in Bitcoin mining.
The root of this centralization is the economics of scale: the
bigger you are, the less you can pay for constant costs and
more you can invest in lowering other costs. This can happen
for the verification process, and a few verifiers take control
over all process. First, because verifiers in disjoint cities cannot
be merged and there is no direct competition between them,
there is always some geographical decentralization of verifiers.
For one city, the hierarchical voting system can prevent such
centralization, because it collects meaningful votes, means that
you put your vote on someone who you know him, preventing
some “celebrity” or “briber” from collecting votes. Also,
nature of verification process is not something like mining and
does not need complex knowledge or expensive devices, and
everyone can get into it (It just need your “time”, biometric
device and small place).
F. Fairness
G. Lack of Incentive
V. ANALYSIS
VI. APPLICATIONS
A. Novel mining system
Satoshi designed a mining system which he called it one-
CPU-one-vote. The idea behind this is to make it near one-
person-one-vote because almost everyone has one CPU, and
the system remains decentralized because CPU power is
distributed around the world. Recently introduced Proof-of-
Stake systems have a notion of reducing the energy needed
by the proof-of-work system. Both PoS and PoW systems are
vulnerable to centralization and other attacks. In UniqueID,
however, we have new design space for consensus algorithms.
These algorithms are based on the one-person-one-account
property of the system. Having a reliable account on who can
enter the system, one can design fair and robust algorithms.
Even some naive ideas like Delegated Proof-Of-Stake can
change their voting system and become based on real humans,
instead of stakeholders. Reputation mining can be designed
where everyone has a permanent account. Nothing-at-stake
problems can also be mitigated by assigning reputations,
such that working on other forks make your reputation near
zero. We think that designing efficient, fair and decentralized
consensus protocols based on a one-human-one-vote basis is
an interesting and independent challenge.
B. Accountable Voting and Survey
Voting is a critical part of all democratic systems, also
surveys play an important role in media and decision making
processes, but there’s no solution for running a public and
accountable online voting without trusting any third-party to
protect it against Sybil attacks or fake identities.
Recent advancements in cryptography and blockchains tech-
nology offer many powerful solutions for end-to-end secure
voting and auditable decentralized voting systems. UniqueID
as a decentralized identity solution will make it possible
to use all those advancements for social benefits without
compromising people privacy.
C. Universal Basic Income
Universal basic income (UBI) is a kind of welfare system
that is based on giving everyone a guaranteed basic income,
totally independent of any other income. The idea of national
basic income dates back to 18th century but various technical
and political issues such as lack of trusted computational
infrastructure or a form of trusted universal identity prevented
implementation of a UBI system. Though UBI idea originally
was presented as a way to save the society from poverty
and injustice, many AI experts claim that given the fast and
tremendous success of AI technology the world is heading
toward a mass unemployment and a UBI system is inevitable
and certainly required.
UniqueID provides a trustable universal identity and build-
ing a UBI system on top of it is just as easy as writing a simple
smart-contract on Ethereum network or any other blockchain
with access to UniqueID’s validated identities.
D. Reputation Systems
Reputation systems are tools to build trust in online commu-
nities. Many motivations including the emergence of sharing
economy and online marketplaces encourage using a reputa-
tion system. Theoretical studies in game theory and practical
experiments agree that a valid and reliable reputation system
must have a long life length and be protected against Sybil
attacks.
Creating reputation systems on top of a decentralized identity
system such as UniqueID will make Sybil attacks impossible
or very expensive and on the other hand, can guarantee a long
lifetime.
E. General Framework for Organization
In an abstract and conceptual level, Bitcoin’s idea is to de-
centralize a specific computational process using redundancy
of computation, Ethereum extended this idea and made it
possible to decentralize any computational process.
UniqueID’s idea is to decentralize operation of a specific or-
ganization which is responsible for providing universal unique
identity, and we claim that by extending same governance
scheme and redundancy of operation, one can think of a
general framework to decentralize operation of organizations.
F. Rethinking Governance
Recently there were a number of discussions about various
models of blockchain governance. These discussions mainly
focus on pros and cons of on-chain votings with the proof-of-
stake mechanism. It seems that these votings can have harmful
outcomes, mainly due to the large asymmetry in the number
of coins each member of the crypto community holds. A one-
person-one-vote system can enable us new ways of thinking
about governance problems in blockchain space. As an exam-
ple, Futarchy, as proposed and combined with blockchain in
[17], needs such a one-person-one-account system.
G. Social Media
H. Fake News
VII. REVIEWS
We categorize previously existing ideas in this area in two
different categories, first decentralized identity management
solutions which aim to provide a decentralized infrastructure
to host centralized issued identities, including DID, Sovrin,
and uPort. The second one is decentralized identity issuance
solutions which aim to create or define a new kind of identity
that is decentralized from its origin, including Democracy
Earth and Bitnation, Proof-of-Personhood.
Our work can be categorized in the later one, decentral-
ized identity issuance systems. We want to emphasize that
despite previously known solutions, UniqueID can bring de-
centralized, permanent, unique identity into reality by utilizing
biometric authentication and social smart contracts.
In the following section, we briefly review some of the men-
tioned schemes and compare them to UniqueID in measures
of political and operational decentralization, Sybil attack resis-
tance permanence of issued identities, and proper governance
and incentive mechanisms.
A. uPort
uPort is a decentralized infrastructure for claiming identities
and receiving verification from other parties in the network.
One can use uPort to host and digitize her identity documents
such as national ID card or driving license and get verified by
officials or other people for being the owner of the claimed
identity.
First of all, uPort is not designed for a decentralized
originated identity which is well defined. Due to lack of a
general identifier in the uPort network, uPort do not provide
a direct solution to anti-Sybil attack and enabling a universal
basic income system. Though uPort provides the possibility to
define decentralized originated identities, there is no intrinsic
incentive or mechanism to do it.
B. Sovrin
Sovrin is a protocol and decentralized app based on its
own blockchain, aiming to create a sovereign identity and
decentralized trust, it is focused on delivering a kind of identity
which is secure, private, and partially provable. In the current
design of Sovrin system, a trusted set of operations maintain
issuing new identities in a semi-decentralized manner. By
utilizing its own token, issuers are economically incentivized
to participate in the system, though theres no governance
mechanism to prevent issuing fake identities and Sybil attacks.
While Sovrin claims that it will become fully decentralized in
future but currently theres no clear scheme for decentralizing
issuing new identities in Sovrin network.
C. Democracy Earth
Democracy Earth is going to be a decentralized app mainly
concerned with providing a infrastructure for liquid democracy
and voting. Naturally, it does need a unique identity scheme
to prevent Sybil attacks. Although currently it is proposed that
each new user upload a video from herself in a concrete format
to prove her uniqueness but theres no clear scheme with an
acceptable error that compares videos and verifier uniqueness
of new users. It is also suggested that Democracy Earth utilize
other platforms to identify its users.
D. everid
E. DID
F. ID2020
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